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Without any fanfare, the United States has now
closed a long chapter in its monetary history. On
December 31, 1974, the Government revoked a
41-year ban on U.S. citizens' ownership of gold,
and a week later, on January 6, 1975, it started
auctioning a portion of its gold stock on the open
market. These actions not only signaled the U.S.
Government's decision to end the monetary role of
gold, but also called into question the metal's fu-
ture role in the world economy. Symbolically, the
auction was conducted not by the U.S. Treasury, a
monetary authority, but rather by the General Ser-
vices Administration, a housekeeping arm of the
U.S. Government. Thus, in a quiet way the U.S.
Government suggested to the world that hence-
forth it will handle its gold in the same way it han -
dies its used office furniture.
This historical decision presaging an end to the
monetary role of gold has important implications
for the world at large. As far back as mankind's
memory extends, gold has been associated with
money as a store ofvalue, as a means of payment,
and as abacking for national currencies. Because of
the deep-rooted association of gold with money,
many people will continue to regard gold as aprime
financial assetfor a long time into the future. Advo-
cates of gold will question not only the
Government's wisdom in attempting to demonetize
the metal, but even its ability to end unilaterally the
monetary role of gold, either in the international
monetary system or in the minds of the public.
Subsequent to the U.S. actions, France an-
nounced on January 9 a revaluation of its official
5
gold holdings, from the former official price of
$42.22 per ounce to $170.40 per ounce, in orderto
bring the valuation closer to the market price of
gold. It also declared that another revaluation
would be made six months later. The operational
meaning of the French decision was unclear, since
nothing was said about the intended relationship, if
any, between the "valuation price" and future of-
ficial gold transactions. Since France holds the
world's third largest official gold reserves l and has
long advocated a stronger international role for
gold, its policy will undoubtedly have a very large
influence on the metal's future.
In this atmosphere of controversy and uncer-
tainty, it is essential that the public obtain a clear
understanding of the changing role of gold in the
international monetary system. In the gold market,
perhaps more than in any other market, demand
and supply conditions depend crucially on what
governments do with their huge stock of the
commodity.2 Although predictions are difficult to
make, it is well to remember that there is a long
evolutionary process behind recent government ac-
tions, as well as a certain logic that limits and
compels policy decisions.
The next section provides an historical perspec-
tive on the role of gold in international finance.
The third and fourth sections then consider the
rationale of recent Government actions towards
demonetizing gold, especially in view of the criti-
cism that much of the recent financial disorder, na-
tional and international, can betraced to the gradual
abandonmentofthe gold standard. Thefinal sectionexplores the future prospects ofgold in the interna-
tional monetary system.
After examining the various options available to
governments, we conclude that the prospects for a
resurrection of gold are rather dim. Unless a new
"gold-center country" emerges to buy and sell
gold at fixed "official" prices-which appears
unlikely-gold will soon join silver as just another
relic of the past. If, as seems likely, the mystique
of gold does begin to fade away, there might be a
scramble of governments to sell off gold but few
buyers for the metal. The market price conceivably
could tumble very sharply in view ofthe huge offi-
cial gold stocks relative to the potential size of the
world gold market. In that case, an international
agreement might become necessary to maintain the
value of official gold holdings for preserving na-
tional savings already embodied in such assets.
The International Monetary Fund possibly could
function as an ultimate depository of unwanted of-
ficial gold in exchange for Special Drawing Rights
(SDRs) at some agreed official price. In any event,
some contingency planning might be needed in
order to forestall large-scale dumping of official
gold, which could result in disorderly conditions in
the market to the detriment of the interests of gold
producers, users, and holders alike.
Historical Perspective
The international gold standard, although ex-
tinct in practice, continues to survive in the minds
of men today. Intelligent laymen frequently ask,
"Ifthe dollar is not backed by gold, what holds up
its value?" Such misgivings are deeply rooted in
tradition. Historically, the value of money in most
major countries was anchored on gold. For cen-
turies gold coins circulated within those countries
as well as across national boundaries as a generally
accepted means of payment. Throughout the
nineteenth century, especially during the last quar-
ter ofthe century, monetary authorities were above
all concerned with maintaining the public's confi-
dence in the national currency by insuring its con-
vertibility into gold.
This mode of official thinking lasted well into
the twentieth century, long after most nations
abandoned the gold standard in the 1930's. Al-
though private citizens could no longer convert
dollars into gold, U.S. monetary authorities con-
tinued in the 1960's to speak of the need to "de-
fend the dollar" at its then par value of $35 per
ounce of gold. When that value became indefensi-
ble, the dollar was twice devalued, and the action
was officially described each time as a devaluation
in terms of gold: first to $38 per ounce in De-
cember 1971 and then to $42.22 per ounce in Feb-
ruary 1973. It is thus small wonder that the general
public should continue to view the dollar's value in
terms of gold.
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The popular misgivings seem to stem from two
fundamental misconceptions about the relationship
between gold and money. The first suggests, mis-
takenly, that it was the gold backing of national
currencies that supported their values under the
gold standard. The second misconception ignores
significant changes that have occurred in the inter-
national monetary system since the high water-
mark of the gold standard nearly a century ago.
On the first point, recent studies have indicated
that it was the national currencies that supported
the value of gold, not the other way around. 3
Throughout the nineteenth century, the converti-
bility of major national currencies into gold pro-
vided the necessary support ofthe value of gold in
terms of those currencies. Whenever the price of
gold threatened to fall below its official support
price, as happened in the case of major gold dis-
coveries or technological breakthroughs in metal
refining, the monetary authorities would buy up all
the goldoffered to them. Moreover, atthe officially
fixed prices, newly mined gold poured into official
reserves in both the gold-avalanche periods of
1849-72 and 1893-1913 and the leaner years of
1873-92.4 This suggests that the market-
equilibrium price of gold in the absence of official
support would have been consistently below offi-
cial support prices between 1849 and 1913. A
similar phenomenon occured in the 1930's when
the United States raised its official support pricefrom $20.67 to $35 per ounce, thereby setting offa
gigantic flood of gold into its monetary reserves.
The national monetary authorities supported the
value of gold throughout this period because gold
then played a key role in the international monet-
ary system. Over the last one hundred years, how-
ever, that role has gradually diminished. Instead of
saying that the U.S. dollar is no longer backed by
gold, we should say that gold is no longer sup-
ported by the U.S. dollar.
The decline and fall of the gold standard has
been so exhaustively analyzed in standard text-
books and popular writings5 that it would not be
worthwhile repeating here. Suffice it to say that
gold's relative importance started to decline even
during the nineteenth centry, as its share in the
aggregate money supply of Britain, France, and
the United States declined from about one-third in
1815 to only one-tenth in 1913, while the share of
bank deposits expanded from a mere six percent to
sixty-eight percent. 6 Robert Triffin has charac-
terized this period as a century of "gradual
euthanasia" of gold money and its replacement by
credit money. 7
After World War I, national monetary au-
thorities made numerous efforts to restore the pre-
war gold standard, but their efforts ended in com-
plete collapse in the 1930's, when all nations, one
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after another, went off gold. Rising economic
nationalism and the huge dislocations of the Great
Depression completely destroyed any chance of
success for the interwar restoration of the gold
standard. On the other hand, the restoration of that
standard at inappropriate par values of national
currencies contributed significantly to the
economic instability of the 1920's, and the failure
of the "gold-bloc" nations to go off gold until
1936 retarded economic recovery in the 1930's. 8
The post-World War II international monetary
system, as set forth in the Articles ofAgreement of
the International Monetary Fund, was nominally a
gold-exchange standard but functioned primarily
as a dollar standard. The United States took upon
itself the responsibility of maintaining the conver-
tibility of its currency into gold for foreign official
holders at a fixed par value, while other member
nations pegged their currencies to the U.S. dollar.
The coexistence of both gold and the dollar as
international reserve assets proved to be a major
source of instability for the IMF system. After
1965 strong speculative pressures developed
against the dollar, when it became increasingly ap-
parent that that currency was overvalued.
The rest is familiar history. When in August
1971 the United States closed its gold window
even to foreign official dollar holders, it severed in
one stroke the last functional link between the dol-
lar and monetary gold. Nevertheless, another three
years passed before the world's monetary au-
thorities decided, in January 1975, to abolish the
official price which has maintained gold nominally
as the standard of the international monetary sys-
tem. TheU.S. Governmentis now treatingits stock
of gold as an ordinary commodity to be auctioned
off piecemeal if it so wishes. For this country at
least, there is little prospect that gold will everagain
playaprominent role in the reformed international
monetary system.The Case Against Demonetization
The objective of the U.S. Government to de-
monetize gold has hardly gone unquestioned. In-
deed, the advocates of gold believe that its role
should be strengthened rather than weakened.
They advance three arguments: (1) the constraints
of a gold standard would check excessive mone-
tary expansion and world inflation; (2)stable ex-
change rates based on the gold par value of na-
tional currencies would facilitate international
trade and investment; and (3) gold remains
superior to either SDRs or foreign exchange as a
reserve asset.
(1) The "discipline" of the gold
standard and domestic price stability
One ofthe gold advocates' strongest arguments
is the need for the so-called "discipline" of the
gold standard to set prescribed automatic limits to
the powers ofnational monetary authorities. When
a country's money supply is not tied to gold or to
some other commodity standard, it is asserted,
political expediency or misguided judgment would
too often lead the monetary authorities to expand
the money supply at an excessive rate for a pro-
longed period of time, resulting in inflations fol-
lowed by recessions. But economic instability
could be avoided or at least lessened ifmoney were
rigidly tied to a commodity standard, under which
the monetary authorities would be obligated to
convert the national fiat money into gold or
another commodity (e.g., silver) or into a standard
basket ofcommodities at some fixed rate. Convert-
ibility could be either universal or limited; in the
first case, it would be available to all holders offiat
money (domestic or foreign) and, in the second
case, limited to foreign official holders.9 The stan-
dard ofreference in most ofthese discussions is the
1870-1914 version of the international gold stan-
dard and the monetary doctrines underlying it.
There is indeed considerable truth in these argu-
ments. The chief virtues of a commodity standard
are impersonality and automaticity. A gold stan-
dard or, for that matter, any commodity standard is
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"impersonal," because it is mechanically governed
by set rules, requiring no forecasting and no ad-
ministrative or legislative decisions; hence it is not
subject to the hazards oferroneous forecasting and
bad decisions. The mechanism is also "automati-
cally stabilizing," because-under certain
conditionslO-it tends to augment national income
when it is relatively low and to subtract from in-
come when it is relatively high.
In fact, however, neither the gold standard nor
the silver standard worked out very well. Dis-
coveries ofnew mines and breakthroughs in refin-
ing technology were major sources ofinstability in
the nineteenth-century international monetary sys-
tem. Indeed, far from the idealized version, the
world economy during the heyday of the gold
standard was characterized by wide fluctuations of
both output and prices. As Robert Mundell has
pointed out, instead of controlling liquidity in
order to avoid inflation and deflation, "under the
gold standard, inflation and deflation were the
means by which liquidity was controlled."ll
Twentieth-century reality has also conflicted
with the idealized version ofthe gold-standard ad-
justment mechanism, which presumes a great deal
of price flexibility in both upward and downward
directions. Wage and price rigidity has increased
significantly, especially since the end of World
War II, as a result of growing unionization and
oligopolistic market structures throughout the
world. Given the present structure ofthe economy,
sustained monetary deflation would result in wide-
spread unemployment and business recessions to a
much greater extent than in the preceding century.
Moreover, given modem full-employment
policies, a strict adherence to the gold-standard
rules of monetary management probably would be
politically unacceptable .12
This is not to imply that the world monetary
system in the twentieth century has fared any better
than in the nineteenth century.13 Rather, the cen-
tral point is that a gold standard is neither neces-sary nor sufficient for insuring monetary stability.
If national monetary authorities can accept rigid
monetary restraints, then tying currencies to gold
is clearly not necessary. On the other hand, the
experiences of the nineteenth century and of the
1920'sand 1930's show that adherence to a gold




Gold advocates have frequently argued that,
when national currencies are tied to gold at fixed
prices, the resultant fixed-exchange rates would
effectively tie the various national economies to-
gether in a common-currency area and thus greatly
facilitate international trade and investment. Con-
versely, flexible exchange rates would break up
these ties and hamper international trade and in-
vestment.
The argument has lost much ofits former attrac-
tiveness in the past decade. Throughout the 1960's
and early 1970's, the mounting barriers to interna-
tional trade and investment in the name of "de-
fending" the par-value system made an irony of
the argument, and in the last few years, our actual
experience with flexible exchange rates has further
demonstrated its hollowness. Even the most dedi-
cated opponents of flexible exchange rates must
admit that the system has worked much better than
they had expected, and that restrictions on capital
flows are much less now than previously.
In this contradictory world, characterized by na-
tional policy decisions in a tightly-integrated and
mutually-interdependent world economy, national
governments have tried but failed to maintain a
fixed-exchange-rate system. They now realize that
a flexible-exchange-rate system may well be the
only workable system under the circumstances.
Furthermore, even if countries wished to reestab-
lish fixed rates at some time in the future, they
could readily achieve this goal without resorting to
gold as an intermediate measure of value.
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(3) Gold as a superior
international reserve asset
As far back as man can remember, gold has
been used as a safe store ofvalue. National curren-
cies may come and go, but gold remains precious
in people's minds. Especially during times of war
and inflation, when national currencies rapidly
lose their value, the public seeks refuge in that
precious metal. Why has gold been universally re-
garded as a safe asset in preference to national
currencies?
The answer has already been suggested, but it is
worth reiterating here. Historically, gold and silver
were regarded as safe stores ofvalue, not because
of any intrinsic value, but rather because of their
adoption at one time or another as the bases of
national and international monetary standards. The
official endorsement of these metals as standards
of value-and the official assurance of their con-
vertibility into national currencies at fixed
prices-supported their values and thus their gen-
eral acceptance as stores ofvalue. During times of
war and inflation, these metals were preferred to
depreciating national currencies because ofthe fact
(or belief) that gold or silver could be converted
into other foreign currencies that were not falling
so rapidly in value in terms of commodity-
purchasing power. Ever since the rise of fiat
money, it was the ultimate official support of the
price of gold in terms of a national currency that
made this metal valuable, not the other way
around.
The popular idea of gold being a safe store of
value puts the cart in front of the horse. Also, it
stems from a set ofinstitutional arrangements that
have long since passed into history. Witness the
fate of silver. After the monetary authorities
stopped supporting the price of silver in terms of
their national currencies, silver became no more
than an ordinary metal. Now that the United States
has stopped supporting gold and no other nation
has shown any readiness to take her place, gold
cannot be considered a safe asset any longer.The Case For Demonetization
But why should the U.S. Government decide to
demonetize gold? The answers are twofold: (1) the
gold-dollar standard was unstable, and (2) SDRs
have emerged as an international reserve asset
superior to gold and foreign exchange.
(1) Instability of the
gold-dollar standard
For a quarter-century following World War II,
the international monetary system was fonnally on
a gold-dollar standard, with the value ofthe dollar
tied to gold at a fixed price of $35 per ounce and
linked to other national currencies through a sys-
tem of fixed exchange rates. With respect to
exchange-rate adjustments, the United States was
in a fundamentally different position from other
countries, in that each ofthe latter could repeg the
exchange rate ofits currency against the U.S. dol-
lar, subject to approval of the International Mone-
tary Fund, for correcting a "fundamental dis-
equilibrium" in its balance of payments. The
United States, on the other hand, with its currency
pegged to gold, was not well situated to alter the
exchange rates between the dollar and other cur-
rencies for correcting its own balance-of-payments
problems-as was demonstrated by the difficult
dollar depreciation of August - December 1971.
Compounded with this asymmetry was a de-
valuation bias in the exchange-rate adjustments
that took place in the quarter-century between the
establishment of the IMF system in 1946 and its
collapse in 1971. Except for the reserve-currency
country, the stock of any deficit country's interna-
tional reserves ultimately placed a limit on the ex-
tent to which devaluation could be delayed. How-
ever, there was no corresponding constraint forc-
ing a surplus country to revalue its currency
against the dollar. In fact, with the exceptions of
the German mark, the Dutch guilder, and the
Canadian dollar, all the exchange-rate adjustments
during that quarter-century were devaluations
against the dollar. This development took place
against the background ofa significant lag in U.S.
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productivity growth, relative to its major trading
partners, and an acceleration in U.S. inflation after
the mid-1960's. Thus, over time the U.S. dollar
became increasingly overvalued.
The progressive overvaluation of the dollar had
two major consequences. First, U.S. payments
deficits resulted in an accumulation of dollar
liabilities in foreign official holdings increasingly
larger than what foreign monetary authorities de-
sired to hold. By mid-1971, such liabilities
amounted to about $50 billion, nearly three times
their size five years earlier, and almost five times
the then-official value of U.S. gold reserves. The
reality of gold convertibility of the dollar was al-
ready dead when the United States officially
closed its gold window in August 1971.
The second major consequence was a mounting
stress in the U.S. domestic economy, as industries
here found it increasingly difficult to compete with
foreign products in either the export or the domes-
tic markets, and as investment incentives turned
more and more in favor of production abroad than
in the United States. Demands for protectionist
legislation against imports and overseas invest-
ments mounted in the Congress and among the
general public.
The gold-dollar standard under the IMF sys-
tem, in principie, was not necessarily unstable. it
could have endured, for instance, if (a) the surplus
and deficit countries had been equally ready to
adjust their exchange rates against the dollar, (b)
the growth rate ofthe U.S. money supply had been
more in tune with what was required for the stabil-
ity of the international monetary system, and (c)
there had been an adequate growth of world re-
serve assets other than liabilities of individual
countries.
However, since none of these conditions was
met, the system was in fact unstable. The United
States found itself increasingly in an untenable
position, with mounting liabilities to foreigners
and mounting problems among domestic produc-ers. In one stroke, it severed the link between the
dollar and gold in August 1971. Since then, it has
resisted all pressures to retie the dollar to gold.
(2) SDRs as a primary
international reserve asset
Since their initial creation in January 1970, the
IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) have grown
to a total of $10.6 billion at the end of 1974. Al-
though they account for only about five percent of
total world reserves,14 SDRs possess a number of
highly attractive features as an international re-
serve asset.
First, unlike gold, SDRs are costless to pro-
duce; this is an important feature in a world of
expanding trade and investment, where there is a
need for steady growth of reserve assets. Second,
they provide a means for internationally controlled
growth of world liquidity. This is in contrast to
gold, the supply of which can fluctuate considera-
bly because oftechnological or speculative factors,
or to the dollar, the supply of which is controlled
by the monetary authority of a single country. The
creation of SDRs reflects the collective will of the
international community and hence might avoid
both inflationary and deflationary extremes,15 and
it is thus more rational than the creation ofliquidity
under the gold-dollar standard.
Third, SDRs represent a more equitable way of
distributing reserve assets than does either gold or
the dollar. Money embodies command over re-
sources. The issuer of money possesses the power
to command resources-"seigniorage"-wherever
the money is accepted as a means ofpayment. The
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United States, as the principal issuer of interna-
tional money under the gold-dollar standard, was
widely accused ofabusing the seigniorage privilege
by excessive monetary expansion, especially after
the mid-1960's. The benefits of seigniorage under a
pure gold standard accrued to gold-producing na-
tions, to the extent that the official price of gold was
set above its production cost. In contrast, the
seigniorage gains of SDR creation are distrib-
uted to IMF members in accordance with inter -
nationally agreed rules.
Fourth, unlike gold, SDRs pay interest. The an-
nual interest rate was 1Vl percent until mid-1974,
but it was then raised to 5 percent, adjustable
periodically in line with money rates in several
major markets. Also, SDRs have a more stable
foreign-currency value than any single national cur-
rency, since their value is now setdaily by the IMF
on the basis of a weighted composite of 16 major
currencies. Moreover, with gold's future in doubt,
SDRs should be a less risky international reserve
asset than gold. Indeed, in view ofall the desirable
properties enumerated here, SDRscan be expected
ultimately to replace gold as a primary international
reserve asset. The U.S. phase-out of gold as a
monetary instrument contributes to that objective.Prospects of Gold in the International Monetary System
Official Gold Holdings
(End of June 1974)
Source: Based on data in International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics, December 1974. Original
dataare values inU.S.dollars, convertedto ouncesat $42.22per
ounce.
establishment of a new, higher official gold
price.I8 The proposal would have prolonged the
use of gold as a means of settlement between na-
tional central banks, and thus might have avoided
too abrupt a termination ofgold's age-old role as a
major international reserve asset. Raising the offi-
cial price of gold, however, would run the risk of
conferring official sanction on an arbitrary price
which has little prospect of adjustment. Itis hard to
conceive how gold could be phased out once an
official price was restored. More importantly, on
the basis of the preceding analysis of the U.S.
experience with the former gold-dollar standard, it
is extremely doubtful that the U.S. Government
would be willing again to tie the dollar to gold.
What will be the future role ofgold in the after-
math of U.S. demonetization? The subject was
discussed in a meeting of the IMF Interim Com-
mittee (successor to the Committee of 20) on
January 15-16 in Washington. Agreement was
then reached to abolish the official gold price and
to allow all central banks to value their gold and
use it in any way they want. 16 Subject to ratifica-
tion by the IMF Governors at their annual meet-
ings in September, the agreement would in effect
demonetize gold for the international monetary
system as a whole, but leave it to individual coun-
tries to decide on their national gold policies. It is
useful to explore what options there are for indi-
vidual countries, and what problems are likely to
arise when and if those options are exercised.
The basic facts are fairly straightforward. As
shown in the table below, the world's official gold
reserves-holdings of the monetary authorities of
non-Communist nations as well as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bank for In-
ternational Settlement (BIS)-amount to about 1.2
billion ounces. There is no way to measure the size
ofthe world's private gold holdings, although they
probably amount to about 2.5 billion ouncesY
This country is by far the largest official holder
of gold, followed by Germany, France, Switzer-
land, and Italy. The U.S. holdings amount to
about one-fourth oftotal official gold holdings. In
addition, the IMF also holds a sizable
amount-more than any individual country except
the United States.
Because of the size of this country's holdings,
U.S. policy should be the most important, if not
the deciding, factor governing the future course of
gold. The United States has begun to demonetize
gold, but others might still question the finality of
that decision. After all, the modest amount-less
than one million ounces-that was sold in the re-
cent auction represents only a small fraction ofthe
U.S. gold stock.
One proposal reportedly advanced in earlier













































1,180.3More modest proposals for a transitional monet-
ary role for gold have been to allow official trans-
fers of gold at variable market-related prices or to
use gold as collateral for official loans. While no
government or central bank (as far as is known)
has yet shown any interest in buying gold at the
market price,19 one large gold-collateral loan has
been made. In 1974, Italy borrowed approximately
$2 billion from Germany on this basis. This trans-
action illustrates the type of transitional arrange-
ment which can assist countries traditionally de-
pendent upon gold reserve assets through a period
when outright gold transactions are no longer feasi-
ble measures.
With the U.S. Government committed to a
course ofdemonetizing gold, the question arises of
what it should do with its remaining 275 million
ounces. Since the gold stock serves no useful func-
tion and only costs money to store, the taxpayers'
interest might dictate selling it offas quickly as the
market can absorb, at prices that would maximize
the return to the Treasury without unnecessarily
antagonizing foreign central banks. In 1973, we
imported (net of exports) more than 2 million
ounces of gold-down sharply from the nearly 6
million ounces in 1971, but still a very substantial
volume. Now that gold ownership is permitted to
U.S. citizens, U.S. demand for gold ought to be
met outofidlegovernmentstocks, rather than out of
imports.
The U.S. Government's decision certainly will
affect what foreign governments do with their
gold. Traditionally, many of them have strongly
supported the status quo and thus have resisted the
U.S. attempt at demonetization of gold in the in-
ternational monetary system. The recent French
action in raising the value of its official gold re-
serves to $170.40 per ounce might suggest the pos-
sibility of a new "gold bloc" arising around the
French franc as it did in the 1930's. The European
Economic Community (EEC) nations, with offi-
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cial holdings of about 450 million ounces, account
for about 35 percent of total world gold reserves,
and they might conceivably attempt to preserve
gold's former role by agreeing to an official price
of gold in terms of one oftheir currencies. In such
an event, that chosen currency would in effect be-
come the reserve currency for the gold bloc and for
all other countries that might wish to tie their cur-
rencies to gold-bloc currencies. The center-
currency country would then be called on to "de-
fend" the gold parity of its currency, thus finding
itself in much the same position as the United
States did prior to August 1971. However, it ap-
pears rather unlikely that any of them would be
willing to be maneuvered into such an unenviable
position.
The question of how to handle the transitional
role of gold is particularly significant in view of
the serious balance-of-payments problems result-
ing from the recent quadrupling of world oil
prices. The official gold reserves of the major in-
dustrial nations originally had been accumulated
through past balance-of-payments surpluses. Now,
their balance of payments have turned adverse. It
stands to reason that these nations should at least
have the option of using their gold reserves for
financing oil-related payments deficits, rather than
suffering a large depreciation of their currencies.
But, who might be the potential gold buyers?
Offhand, they would appear to be the buyers in the
world's private gold markets. In fact, however,
those markets are notoriously thin. If a number of
governments started to unload their gold stocks
there, the gold price could decline substantially
before reaching equilibrium. Potential gold pur-
chasers would probably react quickly and add to
the downward pressure by speculating on further
declines in the gold price. The already thin market
would become even thinner on the buyers' side.
Even if the private demand for gold remained
strong because of the public's deep-rooted attach-
ment to gold, official gold sales would only shift
the balance-of-payments problem from gold-
selling nations to gold-buying nations. Such a
move might cushion the balance-of-payments ad-
justments between surplus and deficit countries,
but itwould not help the financing of the oil def-
icits of consuming nations unless oil-producingnations were willing to absorb gold.20
But would the oil producers be willing either to
take gold for oil payments or to purchase gold from
the open market? The former probably would be
hard to negotiate because ofthe difficulty of agree-
ing on a price for gold. The latter would be quite
unlikely, especially ifthe gold price started to tum-
ble. In any case, the Middle East nations, contrary
to their popular image, traditionally have not been
large gold holders.21
What governments could do with their existing
gold holdings, aside from financing oil deficits,
remains an unanswered question. The foregoing
analysis suggests the possibility of a disorderly
market, with governments attempting to sell off
their gold stocks and few buyers on the other side
of the market. The analysis might be overdrawn,
in view of individuals' traditional preference for
gold over national currencies, especially during
periods of world inflation. Yet such an eventuality
FOOTNOTES
1After the United States and Gennany. Fordata on official gold
reserves, see table on page 12.
2For a detailed analysis ofdemand and supply conditions in the
gold market, see the accompanying article by Michael W.
Keran and Michael Penzer,"Gold as a Private Hedge Against
Inflation."
3Robert Triffin, Our International Monetary System: Yester-
day, Today, and Tomorrow (New York: Random House,
1966), especially pages 3-60; and Robert A. Mundell, The
International Monetary System: Conflict and Reform (Quebec,
Canada: The Canadian Trade Committee, 1965), especially
page 21.
4Triffin, op. cit., page 25.
5For instance, "The Rise of Gold as a Domestic Standard" in
this Review. May '1961, pages 84-96.
6Robert Triffin, op cit., Table 1.2, page 26. The balance ofthe
aggregate money supply in 1913 was accounted for by silver (3
percent) and currency (19 percent), both of which had declined
sharply since 1815.
7Ibid., page ix.
8See the accompanying article by Kurt Dew, "Gold Policy:
The Thirties and the Seventies."
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could well arise, say, several years down the road.
This suggests the need for some sort ofcontingency
stabilization plan, ifonly for the preservation ofthe
value of the gold assets in official reserves, which
after all represent substantial amounts of national
savings.
As one possibility, the International Monetary
Fund could be asked to purchase from national
monetary authorities any gold they wish to sell in
exchange for SDRs at an agreed price, say, at the
current official price of SDR 35 per ounce. Na-
tional monetary authorities should also be free to
sell gold on open markets at higher prices when
possible. The IMF gold price would support the
value of official gold assets only to the extent of
indirectly supporting the open market, by forestal-
ling potentially large liquidations of official gold
stocks at prices below SDR 35 per ounce. Alterna-
tive approaches could also be devised, but since
negotiations on international monetary issues take
time, it is not too early to start thinking now about
various types of contingency plans.
"For earlier proposals of commodity standards other than gold
and silver, see Benjamin Graham, Storage andStability (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1937) and World Commodities and World
Currency (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1944); also Frank D.
Graham, Social Goals and Economic Institutions (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1942), pp. 94-119.
For an analysis ofthe conceptual basis ofcommodity standards
in general and the commodity-reserve standard in particular,
see Milton Friedman, "Commodity-Reserve Currency,"
Journal ofPolitical Economy, June 1951, pp. 203-232.
10Among the necessary conditions for the smooth working of a
commodity standard are (a) a close relationship between GNP
and changes in money's share oftotal national assets and (b) the
existence of a large stock of the commodity currency that can
readily shift into or out of official money holdings in response
to small changes in commodity prices. On the other hand, if
monetary changes exert only a weak impact on GNP, the
smooth functioning of a commodity standard requires (a) a
highly elastic supply of the currency commodity, such that the
output ofthe commodity can be rapidly expanded or contracted
in response to small changes in the general price level, and (b)
that the industry producing the commodity (say, gold) account
for a sizable fraction of GNP. Friedman notes that gold satis-
fies only one of these conditions-the existence of a large pri-
vate stock capable of shifting back and forth between monetary
and private holdings. He cites Charles O. Hardy's view that
common building bricks (except for their lack ofglamor) would
be a much better currency commodity than gold. Friedman, op.
cit., pp. 204-210, esp. p. 208.
"Mundell, op. cit., p. 22.l2In Robert Mundell's words, "Trade unions made the gold
standard inefficient, while universal suffrage made it unpalata-
ble." Ibid., p. 23. It can also be argued, ofcourse, that expan-
sionary monetary policies since the 1930's have indirectly sup-
ported unions and oligopolistic producers by "validating"
cost-push price increases. The latter interpretation, however, is
not inconsistent with the view that growing unionism and mar-
ket concentration have made monetary contraction politically
and economically less feasible than previously.
13In fact, one could well argue that price and output fluctuations
in the nineteenth century were mild in comparison with those in
the last fifty years. Moreover, since the 1930's thete has been a
pronounced inflationary bias in the system, which was not true
under the gold standard.
14Foreign exchange holdings (mostly dollars) comprised about
70 percent; gold, about 20 percent; and IMF reserve positions,
5 percent of total world reserves.
15The system per se, however, does not preclude over- or
under-creations of SDRs. Creations of SDRs require the ap-
proval by an 85-percent weighted vote of IMF participants. A
handful ofsurplus countries conceivably could blockSDRcrea-
tions ifthey together hold more than 15 percent of the vote. On
the other hand, excessive creations could arise ifmembers hold-
ing more than 85 percent of the vote were so inclined.
15
'"New York Times, January 17, 1975, p. 39.
17Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Gold, Special
Report, November 1974, p. 14. The Soviet Union's gold re-
serve is a tightly held national secret, but is perhaps on the order
of 64 million ounces. New York Times, November 6, 1974,
p. 67.
'"See, for instance, The Wall Street Journal, July 23, 1973,
p. 1.
19Indeed, IMF members are legally prohibited by the present
Articles of Agreement from buying gold at prices in excess of
the current official price.
2°The same stricture applies to the so-called "Ossola Plan,"
proposed by the Deputy Governor ofthe Bank ofItaly, Rinaldo
Ossola. Under this plan, the IMF would sell gold-denominated
bonds to help provide temporary relief for the countries hardest
hit by oil-price increases. New York Times, December3,1974,
p.57.
21Middle East nations hold small amounts both in absolute
terms and in relation to the size of their total reserve holdings.
At mid-1974, they held only $1.2 billion of their $21.1 billion
total reserves in gold. International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics, December 1974.